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Abstract
We study a model of optimal bankruptcy law in an environment where legal quality
can vary along two dimensions: the quality of contract enforcement, and the ability
of judges. We show that a judicially-inﬂuenced bankruptcy process can enhance the
eﬃciency of incomplete contracts by conditioning the liquidation/reorganization deci-
sion on ex-post information about ﬁrm quality. We consider the optimal balance of
debtor and creditor interests as a function of the legal environment, and show that the
optimal degree of ”creditor-friendliness” in the bankruptcy law increases as the quality
of enforcement of contracts deteriorates and as judicial ability to recognize ﬁrm quality
falls. We also explore the optimal scope of bankruptcy law and ﬁnd that it may be
optimal to ”target” the law to a smaller subset of ﬁrms for which judicial discretion is
most valuable, particularly when judges are less experienced. Our model contributes to
the existing law and ﬁnance literature in demonstrating that optimal bankruptcy laws,
in particular the degree of optimal creditor protection, depends heavily on the existing
legal environment. The model also explains some cross-sectional patterns in bankruptcy
laws adopted around the world.
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Bankruptcy and debt collection laws are increasingly being recognized as fundamental institu-
tions, necessary for the growth of credit markets and entrepreneurship in developing economies.
In practice, the design of these laws varies substantially across countries, along dimensions
such as the allocation of control rights, priority rules, protection of secured creditors, and the
discretion given to bankruptcy judges and administrators. Similarly, the scope of these laws
and their relative use varies greatly across countries (Claessens and Klapper, 2002).
Empirical evidence from the law and ﬁnance literature, most notably that of La Porta,
et. al. (1997, 1998) ﬁnd positive relationships between the degree of creditor-friendliness of
reorganization laws and desirable outcomes such as the size of debt markets. This empirical
ﬁnding raises two important questions. First, what does reorganization law contribute to
the eﬃcient implementation of contracts between ﬁrms and their lenders that could not be
achieved without it? Given that workouts and other private resolutions of distress are often
arranged outside the scope of reorganization procedures, what factors lead some ﬁrms to use
the legal reorganization procedure and others to avoid it? Second, why have many developed
countries, such as France and Japan, recently introduced reorganization laws that resemble
U.S. Chapter 11, which scores among the lowest in the world on these creditor protection
indices? The fact that the degree of creditor protection in reorganization law varies widely
across countries suggests that the appropriate law, and the appropriate balance of debtor and
creditor interests, may depend on extant characteristics of the economy. Indeed, as Hart
(2000) notes:
It is unlikely that “one size ﬁts all.”...Which procedure a country chooses or should
choose may then depend on other factors, e.g., the country’s institutional struc-
ture and legal tradition. One can also imagine a country choosing a menu of
procedures and allowing ﬁrms to select among them. It is important to recognize
that bankruptcy reform should not be seen in isolation: it may be necessary to
combine it with legal and other reforms, e.g., the training of judges, improvements
in corporate governance and the strengthening of investor rights, and possibly even
changes in the international ﬁnancial system.
This paper takes a ﬁrst step toward formally integrating the design of appropriate bankruptcy
procedures into the larger framework of legal institutions and private contractual mechanisms
that govern interactions between borrowers and lenders. Recent contributions in the empir-
ical law and ﬁnance literature make distinctions between the quality of the legal code and
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focuses on the appropriate matching of the legal code to the quality of enforcement, taking as
given that the former is more ﬂexible than the latter. Empirical evidence suggests that legal
code is often responsive to exactly these concerns. For example, Pistor, Raiser, and Gelfer
(2000) reports signiﬁcant improvement in shareholder and the creditor rights in transition
economies during the 1992-1998 period, which they attribute to lawmakers’ response to weak
shareholder/creditor protection in those countries during the privatization process1.
We consider the role of bankruptcy laws as part of an optimal contracting problem between
ﬁrms and their creditors when contracts are incomplete and laws are imperfectly enforced.
While there are many common characteristics that deﬁne reorganization laws, we focus on the
role of judicial discretion in aﬀecting the ownership and control of assets. We demonstrate
two main points related to the impact of reorganization laws on contractual eﬃciency. First,
judicial discretion over the reorganization/liquidation decision can be desired by contracting
parties ex-ante, even when judges are less informed ex-post than the contracting parties and
prone to making errors. When managers are biased toward reorganization and creditors
are biased toward liquidation ex-post, reorganization law can be used to enhance contracts
by conditioning the survival of the ﬁrm on the available ex-post information when this is
diﬃcult to describe in a contract. These ex-post biases are in part driven by the quality of
investor protection and the legal environment: the less able are ﬁrms to pledge their future
cash ﬂows to creditors, the more creditors prefer to seize the assets and sell them even if
existing management is eﬃcient. In this sense, the value of reorganization law is directly
inﬂuenced by other legal institutions such as debt collection law, disclosure rules, and the
quality of their enforcement.
Second, our model shows that the optimal balance between ﬁrms and creditors depends not
only on ﬁrm characteristics, such as the proﬁtability and risk of the ﬁrm’s assets, but also on
the quality of the legal environment. In particular, the model shows that as the enforcement
of debt contracts deteriorates (as the veriﬁability of cash ﬂows decreases), ﬁrms prefer a
more creditor-friendly reorganization law: ex-post eﬃcient ﬁrms should face higher barriers
to reorganization in order to protect creditors’ willingness to lend ex-ante. As enforcement of
debt contracts improves, contracts are enhanced by more lenient rules which allow the most
viable ﬁrms to survive over the objections of creditors.
We ﬁnd also that implementation of a debtor-friendly policy requires suﬃcient capability
1Pistor (2000) reports 16 countries in transition economies to establish registers for security interests, which
used EBRD model or US law, during the late 1990s.
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non-viable ﬁrms is poor, ﬁrms prefer a more creditor-friendly law. As judges’ discernment
capabilities increase, the eﬃciency of contracts are enhanced more by debtor-friendly laws.
This theoretical result illustrates a second mechanism by which the quality of institutions
aﬀects not only the eﬀectiveness of the law, but also aﬀects the characteristics of the optimal
law itself.
The results in the model explain some of the cross-sectional variation in bankruptcy laws
around the world, in particular the negative relationship between the creditor-friendliness of
bankruptcy and per-capita GDP, as reported by La Porta, et. al. (1998). The model also
generates predictions about usage rates of reorganization laws, as studied by Claessens and
Klapper (2002). Our model predicts that usage rates of reorganization procedures should be
lowest when the bankruptcy law is a poor match for the legal environment, particularly when
countries with less-developed legal systems do not allow for suﬃcient creditor protection in
reorganization. In such situations, ﬁrms are more likely to use contractual mechanisms that
avoid the law and result in private resolution of ﬁnancial distress.
2 Related Literature
In a world with complete contracts and costless bargaining, bankruptcy, at best, provide a de-
fault rule that replicates private contracting. At worst, bankruptcy laws place restrictions on
contracts that lead to ineﬃciencies. For this reason, seminal works in the legal literature, in-
cluding Baird (1986) and Jackson (1986) advocate market-based mechanisms such as auctions
in place of judicially-administered bargaining, as in Chapter 11. Previous work that justiﬁes
a role for reorganization laws do so on the basis of costly bargaining, incomplete contracts, or
both. Early works on the subject focus on the ability of bankruptcy law to resolve common
pool problems caused by multiple dispersed creditors. Gertner and Scharfstein (1991) focus
on rules of Chapter 11 such as the automatic stay and debtor-in-possession ﬁnancing and their
impacts on investment.
Among the class of models of bankruptcy that address issues similar to ours, the most
relevant are Berkovitch and Israel (1999) and Povel (1999). Berkovitch and Israel (1999)
consider the dependence of optimal bankruptcy laws on the extant environment. In their
paper, the diﬀerence between systems is modeled by the information structure of lenders
rather than the quality of investor protection and enforcement, as we consider here. Povel
(1999), similar to our model, addresses trade-oﬀs between tough (pro-creditor) and soft (pro-
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rather than ownership of assets.
Two other works that adopt similar modeling approaches are Berglof, Roland, von Thadden
(2000), and Giammarino and Nosal (1996). The work by Berglof, Roland, and von Thadden
(2000) similarly examines the role of bankruptcy in a model of nonveriﬁable cash ﬂows. In
their model, bankruptcy is identiﬁed by states in which conﬂicting claims among multiple
creditors are resolved. Unlike our model, they do not consider the role of judicial inﬂuence
over outcomes, and the optimal bankruptcy procedure would arise from a multilateral private
contract without a role for courts. An early exposition of the eﬀect of judicial discretion
in bankruptcy procedure on social welfare has been made by Giammarino and Nosal (1996).
In their model, the role of the bankruptcy judge is to identify and punish strategic default
by managers. Similar to our model, they consider bankruptcy law as an option rather than
an unavoidable procedure, and conclude that the additional option of bankruptcy can be
valuable. Our model diﬀers from theirs in that we solve for optimal laws and examine their
dependence on the legal environment.
Another novel feature of our paper is the explicit modeling of the eﬀects of judicial ex-
pertise on ex-ante contracts and ex-post outcomes. Although it has been recognized in the
legal literature (for example, see Miceli, 1990), the role of judicial error has not been widely
recognized in the bankruptcy literature. We adopt an exogenous setting of judicial error
similar to that of Ayotte and Robinson (2003), who study the role of two-sided error in a
general principal-agent problem with a wealth-constrained agent. Giammarino and Nosal
(1996) brieﬂy analyze one-sided error (the failure to recognize strategic default), ﬁnding that
it reduces the use of bankruptcy law. Chen and Sundaresan (2003) introduces an imper-
fect signal regarding ﬁrm’s viability in a continuous time model of bankruptcy, upon which
the judge decides when to reorganize or to liquidate via Bayesian updating. The result of
their model show that debt contracting may take form of Chapter 11, private workouts or
liquidation depending on the parameters of the model.
Our model also relates to the growing empirical literature on law and ﬁnance. La Porta,
et. al. (1997, 1998) were the ﬁrst to proxy for the strength of creditor protection by using
indices based on reorganization laws. Although they ﬁnd a signiﬁcant positive relationship
between ”creditor friendly” features of reorganization law and the size of debt markets, the
statistical signiﬁcance of this result disappears when legal origin is included. Pistor (2000)
and Pistor, Raiser, and Gelfer (2000) ﬁnd evidence that, in addition to the form of laws, the
quality of legal enforcement is strongly related to similar outcome measures. Claessens and
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eﬃciency. We believe our model is valuable in that it is the ﬁrst, to our knowledge, to model
the way in which bankruptcy rules and their enforcement are interrelated. To the extent that
existing laws (at least partially) reﬂect country-speciﬁc characteristics in an optimal way, our
model can explain some of the observed cross-sectional patterns in bankruptcy laws around
the world. To the extent that laws are occasionally poorly suited to the legal environment, our
model can explain when usage rates are likely to be low due to a poorly-matched procedure.
3 The Benchmark Model: Out-of-Court Distress Reso-
lution
3.1 Model Setup
We consider an economy similar to Bolton and Scharfstein (1996) (hereafter BS (1996)), in
which cash ﬂows from investment projects can be (partially) diverted by borrowers, making
the threat of liquidation necessary to enforce repayment. The risk-neutral manager of each
ﬁrm owns a two-period investment project, which requires an outlay of K at an initial date
0 for the purchase of a physical asset. The ﬁrm is wealthless and must borrow K from a
lender/lenders operating in a competitive credit market.2 At date 1, the project produces a
random cash ﬂow of x with probability θ or zero with probability 1 − θ.
As in BS (1996), we assume that both the ﬁrst period and the second period cash ﬂows
are observable to both parties but are (partially) nonveriﬁable to the third party. This can
result from managerial perquisite consumption or direct expropriation of cash ﬂows. In either
case, we expect that the amount of cash ﬂows that can be pledged to creditors will depend,
at least in part, on the quality of legal enforcement; this will be modeled explicitly in Section
4. In this setting, contracts can not be based on realized cash ﬂows but are instead based on
payments made by the ﬁrm. The general contract speciﬁes that if the ﬁrm makes a payment
Rx, the creditor has the right to liquidate the project with probability βx, and likewise, if
2In this paper, we do not consider issues of coordination among multiple creditors as a motivation for
bankruptcy law. In our model, the law can be valuable apart from resolving creditor runs, so we abstract
from this problem here. For a thorough analysis of these issues from an ex-ante perspective, see Berglof,
Roland and Von Thadden (2000). The ex-ante choice of the number of creditors could matter in this model,
however, in aﬀecting the bargaining power between the manager and creditor(s) following a default. We adopt
a reduced form approach to this problem in allowing the contracting parties to set the bargaining power in
the ex-ante contract.
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Figure 1: Timing of the Game
the ﬁrm makes a payment R0, the creditor has right to liquidate the project with probability
β0.3 Since the creditor acts competitively, the manager makes a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer of a
contract {Rx,βx,R0,β0} to the creditor in exchange for K dollars at date zero.
Since cash ﬂows are not veriﬁable, the ﬁrm can choose whether or not to repay Rx when
cash ﬂow is x>R x. If cash ﬂow is zero, of course, the ﬁrm must default on its debt. Following
BS (1996), we use the term strategic default to refer to the situation in which the ﬁrm has
cash but chooses not to repay, and liquidity default to refer to the situation in which the ﬁrm
cannot repay because cash ﬂow is low.
To model the role of bankruptcy, we depart from BS (1996) in adding uncertainty about
the going-concern value of the ﬁrm at date 1. The continuation and liquidation values of the
ﬁrm after date 1 depends on a random state of nature which is not realized until after the
ﬁrst period cash ﬂow is realized. With probability ϕ,t h eﬁrm’s assets are worth more in the
hands of its existing manager, who can generate gross value y by running the ﬁrm through
date 2. When the existing manager is eﬃcient, creditors can not generate any value from the
assets, but can sell to an outside buyer who can generate γy,w h e r e0< γ < 1. Conversely,
with probability 1−ϕ, the existing manager is ineﬃcient and can generate only γy,w h i l et h e
outside buyer can generate y if he is able to buy the ﬁrm.4After period two, no ﬁxed assets
remain in the ﬁrm and the game ends.
We assume that eﬃcient bargaining takes place between the contractual owner of the
assets and the buyer. The outside buyer is not wealth constrained; thus, when the outsider is
eﬃcient, he will always buy the ﬁrm. Ex-post ineﬃciency may occur, however, if the existing
manager is eﬃcient but wealth-constrained and β0 > 0. If this is the case, the creditor will
3We describe this as probabilistic liquidation rather than partial liquidation, but if the production technol-
ogy is constant returns to scale the two are equivalent here.
4Our results are not sensitive to the speciﬁcation of uncertainty, and the outside buyer can be interpreted
as a break-up liquidation value rather than continuation under a new manager.
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This occurs because second period cash ﬂows are also nonveriﬁable; thus the creditor cannot
induce the manager to make positive payments at date 2.
The key assumption in the model is that this state (the ex-post ﬁrm type) is observable at
date 1, but is suﬃciently complex that it cannot be described it in a contract written at date 0.
This contractual incompleteness, combined with the potential ex-post ineﬃcient liquidation
of the ﬁrm’s assets, can give rise to a role for courts. For now, we consider private distress
resolution, which does not involve intervention by courts in contracts.
3.2 Optimal Contract
As a special case of the general contract described in the previous section, the debt contract
can be expressed as βt =1i fx ≥ Rt,a n dβt =0i fx<R t. This contract, however, is not
optimal and leads to excess liquidation if the ﬁrm does not make the payment Rt.I n s t e a d ,
the optimal contract would be one that liquidates the project with probability less than one
upon payment less than Rt, as will be shown below. After the ﬁrm’s announcement of the ﬁrst
period cash ﬂow, the creditor receives the contractually-speciﬁed payment and liquidates the
project with the ex-ante contracted probability. Before proceeding further into the detailed
analysis, it is worth noting that liquidation of the project with positive probability upon
receiving cash ﬂow Rx, and payment from the creditor to the manager upon realizing zero
cash ﬂow is suboptimal, as in BS (1996).
Lemma 1 (Bolton and Scharfstein, 1996) In an optimal contract, βx =0and R0 =0 .
In order to induce the manager to make payments in the ﬁrst period upon realizing cash
ﬂow x, the manager’s incentive-compatibility constraint must be satisﬁed. Given that the
manager sees his type before deciding whether or not to repay, there are two relevant con-
straints. For the ex-post eﬃcient manager (denoted as the good type), we need
x − Rx +( 1− βx)y + βx(1 − η)y ≥ x − R0 +( 1− β0)y + β0(1 − η)y
where η is the bargaining power of the agent who has the right to sell the physical asset.
Using the results from Lemma 1 above, the good type’s incentive constraint can be simpliﬁed
to
Rx ≤ β0ηy
Similarly, for the ex-post ineﬃcient manager (denoted as the bad type), we need
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where Y = γy+η(1−γ)y is the ex-post ineﬃcient manager’s proﬁt from the sale of the physical
asset to the eﬃcient outside buyer. The ﬁrst term of Y , γy,i st h ei n e ﬃcient manager’s proﬁt
by holding on to the physical asset, and the second term of Y , η(1 − γ)y,i st h ei n e ﬃcient
manager’s bargaining share of the eﬃciency improvement by selling the physical asset to the
eﬃcient outside buyer. Using Lemma 1 as in the good IC’s case, the bad IC reduces to
Rx ≤ β0Y
There are two possible contracts depending on which incentive constraint is satisﬁed by
the contract. When the good IC is satisﬁed, the bad IC is automatically satisﬁed because
ηy ≤ Y . Hence, the creditor can collect at most β0ηy from both the good and the bad types
when the ﬁrst period cash ﬂow is x. On the other hand, when only the bad IC is satisﬁed,
i.e. β0ηy ≤ Rx ≤ β0Y , then the creditor can collect at most β0Y from the bad types when
the ﬁrst period cash ﬂow is x. As shown in the following lemma, however, in this model , it
is always (weakly) better to allow the good types to strategically default in order to collect
more from the bad types.
Lemma 2 (Optimality of Strategic Default) Given the model and assumptions states above,
if η < 1, then the optimal contract chosen by a proﬁt maximizing ﬁrm allows strategic default,
and the creditors will make zero expected proﬁt under this contract. If η =1 ,n os t r a t e g i c
default is allowed.
The optimality of allowing strategic default results from our assumption that the physical
asset will end up in the hands of the eﬃcient agent when the ﬁrst period cash ﬂow is x.S o ,
by allowing the good types to strategically default, the creditor can collect more from the bad
types, and can collect the same expected amount from the good types that would have been
collected if induced to repay5.T h e ﬁrm’s ex-ante expected proﬁt under the contract with
strategic default is given by
ΠF = θ{ϕ[x+(1−β0)y+β0(1−η)y]+(1−ϕ)(x−β0Y +Y )}+(1−θ)(1−β0){ϕy+(1−ϕ)Y }
5Also, note that the bad IC must be binding, otherwise the manager can oﬀer a contract that has lower
liquidation probability, β0, and make the bad IC bind. Such contract will weakly dominate the previous
contract because the manager faces lower liquidation probability while the bad IC is unaﬀected.
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ΠC = θϕβ0ηy + θ(1 − ϕ)β0Y +( 1− θ)β0{ϕηγy +( 1− ϕ)ηy} − K
and the outside buyer’s ex-ante expected proﬁti s
ΠB = θ(1−ϕ)(1−η)(1−γ)y+(1−θ){(1−β0)(1−ϕ)(1−η)(1−γ)y+β0[ϕ(1−η)γy+(1−ϕ)(1−η)y]}
The optimal contract is the one which maximizes the ﬁrm’s proﬁt subject to the creditor’s
participation constraint (denoted as creditor IR), which is ΠC ≥ 06. The resulting optimal
contract is summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 3 (Optimal Contract without Bankruptcy Court) The optimal contract {Rx,βx,R0,β0}
are given as, Rx = β0Y , βx =0 ,R 0 =0 ,a n dβ0 = K
ηy{θ[ϕ+(1−ϕ)(γ+η−ηγ)/η]+(1−θ)[ϕγ+(1−ϕ)]}.
The numerator of β0 is the initial investment made by the creditors, and the denominator
is the expected return to the creditor from the project. For future reference in the following
sections, the social surplus can be evaluated by summing the ﬁrm’s, the creditor’s, and the
outside buyer’s proﬁt, which is given by
ΠS = ΠF + ΠC + ΠB = θx + y − K − β0(1 − θ)ϕ(1 − γ)y
The ﬁrst three terms represent the net present value of the project, and the last term
represents the eﬃciency loss when the physical asset goes to the ineﬃcient outside buyer upon
liquidity default. Social surplus, as well as the ﬁrm’s equilibrium proﬁt, is strictly decreasing
with the liquidation probability β0. Finally, and most importantly, notice that the creditor
and the debtor cannot reach an agreement to continue the ﬁrm with the incumbent manager
upon liquidity default, which is summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 4 (Liquidation Bias) Following a liquidity default, the creditor strictly prefers
liquidation to continuation.
As stated above, the creditor will not let the manager to continue the project upon liquidity
default, even though the creditor knows that the incumbent manager is the eﬃcient type. This
ex-post debtor/creditor conﬂict stems from the nonveriﬁability of the second period cash ﬂow,
in that the second period cash ﬂow cannot be pledged by the ﬁnancially distressed manager
6The creditor IR is binding at optimum, because if it were slack, then the manager can oﬀer a contract
with lower liquidation probability that still satisﬁes the creditor IR and gives higher proﬁt to the manager.
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project, the creditor will receive zero payment at date 1, and also zero payment at date 2. On
the other hand, if the creditor liquidates the project, he can receive positive amount from the
sale of the physical asset, even though the asset ends up in the hand of the ineﬃcient outside
buyer.
We now proceed to analyze the role of bankruptcy courts, which can condition liquidation
probabilities on (noisy) ex-post information about the manager’s quality. The goal of the
court is to increase the eﬃciency of contracts by liquidating ineﬃcient ﬁrms while preventing
liquidation of eﬃcient managers who are liquidity constrained. As we will see, however, this
may exacerbate the tendency of managers to strategically default and can damage lending
markets when the law is poorly matched to the ﬁrm’s characteristics.
4 Reorganization with a Bankruptcy Court
4.1 Model Setup and Optimal Reorganization Law
In our model, the fundamental diﬀerence between reorganization law and out-of-court distress
resolution is the presence of a judge or administrator who is given the power to condition
outcomes on information available when the ﬁrm defaults. This additional ﬂexibility relative
to private distress resolution can result in beneﬁts to using reorganization law instead of private
workouts/ liquidations.7 We assume that at date 1, the judge receives a signal regarding the
manager’s ex-post type, but not the ﬁrst period cash ﬂow. The court can condition the
survival of the ﬁrm on his signal of the ﬁrm’s type and on the manager’s report of the ﬁrst
period cash ﬂow realization.
In terms of notation, this implies that the choice of reorganization law is a choice over








B} depend on the judge’s signal
about the ﬁrm’s type {G,B} and the ﬁrm’s reported cash ﬂow {x,0}. We also allow the
law to allocate the bargaining power η allocated to the ex-post owner of the assets.8 In this
7We should point out that, while it may be possible for private mechanisms to provide for a third-party
arbitrator, there are reasons why this process is handled by a public administrator such as a bankruptcy judge.
First, enforcement of rulings ultimately requires enforcement capability which states are well-equipped to
provide. In many countries, states do not lend legal backing to such procedures, rendering them less eﬀective.
Second, the reorganization mechanism requires that parties are aware of the way ex-post information will
translate into outcomes. A public bankruptcy system may be advantageous because contracting parties can
accurately predict its own outcome in reorganization based on the observable experiences of ﬁrms in the past.
8We expect that the law will be able to inﬂuence bargaining power through rules such as exclusivity periods
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the reorganization law to maximize its proﬁt subject to the participation of the creditor and
outside buyer.9 For simplicity, we assume that bankruptcy is costless, but the manager prefers
to avoid court when he is indiﬀerent.10
Given that the ex-post ﬁrm type is observable to the creditor and ﬁrm at date 1, but both
parties have an incentive to mislead the court, we expect that an information revelation process
would produce imperfect information about the ﬁrm’s viability. To model the potential
fallibility of the judge, we assume he receives an imperfect signal regarding the manager’s
t y p e ,w h e r et h es i g n a lo fm a n a g e rb e i n gag o o dt y p e ,sG, is more likely when the manager is






The error of mistakenly identifying the good type as a bad type is referred as type I error,
and the error of mistakenly identifying the bad type as a good type is referred as type II
error. We assume that the judge’s signal is always partially informative; i.e. 0 < α < 1
2 and
0 < β < 1
2. Before stating the optimal contract, we state the following lemma, which shows
that courts are unnecessary when the ﬁrm repays its debt at date 1:
and stays on collection. Though in reality this ability is at best partial, we consider the extreme case in which
the court sets this value to understand how bargaining power aﬀects outcomes.
9Though we frame the problem as ﬁrm proﬁt maximization subject only to the creditor’s participation
constraint, the optimal reorganization law from the ﬁrm’s perspective is equivalent to the optimal law in a
social planner’s problem where the outside buyer’s utility is also included. The optimal contract in that
problem gives the outside buyer zero surplus making the two problems equivalent.
10Adding a ﬁxed cost of bankruptcy aﬀects the results in a predictable way: contracting parties are more
likely to avoid the court, and conditional on court use, liquidation probabilities are higher in the optimal
policy. We abstract from these issues to simplify the analysis.
11We provided motivation for this exogenous judicial error assumption in the Appendix. It can be shown
that the judicial error can be endogenously derived from particular choice of bankruptcy procedure. In the
static two-period model, however, we take the judicial error as given.
12




B =0 ;judicial dis-
cretion is unnecessary when the ﬁrm repays Rx
Lemma 5 demonstrates that court involvement can only be beneﬁcial when ex-post con-
ﬂicts between debtors and creditors cannot be resolved by bargaining. When the ﬁrm succeeds
and is not liquidity constrained, the ﬁrm and the creditor can bargain toward an eﬃcient out-
come which allows the eﬃcient owner to run the ﬁrm. Given that this is the case, a court





B} could also be achieved by raising or lowering Rx.
Using the result of Lemma 5, the general contract written between the manager and the
creditor is to let the manager continue if Rx is paid in the ﬁrst period, and to ﬁle for bankruptcy
if R0 = 0 is paid.12 The optimal contract is determined by the maximization of ﬁrm proﬁt
subject to the creditor IR, i.e. ΠC = 0, and the manager’s incentive compatibility constraint.
As in the case without the bankruptcy court, there are two possible cases regarding which
manager’s incentive constraints are satisﬁed. The eﬃcient manager’s incentive constraint
(good IC)i sg i v e nb y
x − Rx + y ≥ x − R0 +( 1− α){(1 − βG)y + βG(1 − η)y} + α{(1 − βB)y + βB(1 − η)y}
which reduces to
Rx ≤ βαηy
where βα =( 1−α)βG+αβB is the probability of liquidation of the ex-post eﬃcient manager.
Similarly, the incentive constraint for the ex-post ineﬃcient manager (bad IC)i sg i v e nb y
x − Rx + Y ≥ x − R0 + β{(1 − βG)Y + βG(1 − η)0} +( 1− β){(1 − βB)Y + βB(1 − η)0}
which reduces to
Rx ≤ ββY
where ββ = ββG +( 1− β)βB is the probability of liquidation of the ex-post ineﬃcient man-
ager. For the argument in the following paragraphs, it is useful to compare the liquidation
probabilities for the case that involves and the case that avoids the bankruptcy court, which
is shown in the following lemma.
12When the ﬁrm announces the ﬁrst period cash ﬂow to be x, then mixed strategy of involving and avoiding
court is weakly dominated by purely avoiding the bankruptcy court. The dominance is strict is the involvement
of the bankruptcy court incurs positive amount of cost.
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β0 < ββ < βB
The lemma helps us understand the valuable role of judicial discretion and the cost of
judicial error. In allowing courts to condition outcomes on new information, the ﬁrm would
like to minimize βα, the true liquidation probability when the manager is eﬃcient, since this
is directly related to ex-post eﬃciency. This is accomplished by setting the signal-based
liquidation probability βG lower than the unconditional liquidation probability β0.T h i s i s
costly, however, because a lower liquidation probability encourages strategic default and limits
the ﬁrm’s willingness to repay the creditor. The ﬁrm compensates for this expected loss to
creditors by oﬀering them a higher liquidation payoﬀ when the manager is ineﬃcient, hence
βB > β0 > βG.
When judges make errors, however, the good managers are occasionally seen as bad and
vice versa. This narrows the gap in the “true type” liquidation probabilities and makes
discrimination between types more diﬃcult, hence βG < βα and βB > ββ. As we will see, the
reduced ﬂexibility of the contract caused by judical error will result in eﬃciency losses relative
to a perfectly informed court.
Returning to the analysis of the optimal court-based contract, it can be shown that the
optimal reorganization rule allows strategic default for the ex-post eﬃcient manager, which is
stated formally in Lemma 7.
Lemma 7 (Optimality of Strategic Default) For all 0 ≤ η ≤ 1, good types strategically
default, and bad types repay in the optimal contract. Creditors make zero expected proﬁt.
Notice that in contrast to Lemma 2, strategic default always occurs when the bankruptcy
court is involved, even if η = 1. Intuitively, the good manager’s incentive to behave op-
portunistically is larger relative to the non-court case where the liquidation decision is not
conditioned on manager quality. Using Lemma 7, we know that the bad IC is binding, which
implies Rx = ββY , and the ex-ante expected proﬁt from the project of the ﬁrm, the creditor,
and the outside buyer can be found as,
ΠF = θ{ϕ[x +( 1− βα)y + βα(1 − η)y]+( 1− ϕ)(x − Rx + Y )}
+(1 − θ){ϕ(1 − βα)y +( 1− ϕ)(1 − ββ)Y }
ΠC = θ{ϕβαηy +( 1− ϕ)Rx} +( 1− θ){ϕγβα +( 1− ϕ)ββ}ηy − K
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+(1 − ϕ)[(1 − ββ)(1 − η)(1 − γ)y + ββ(1 − η)y]}
The total social surplus can be obtained by summing the ﬁrm’s, the creditor’s, and the outside
buyer’s expected proﬁt, which reduces to
ΠS = θx + y − K − βα(1 − θ)ϕ(1 − γ)y
The next proposition concerns the optimal balance of bargaining power between the ex-
post owner of the assets and the outside buyer, a topic that has received considerable attention
in the bankruptcy literature. Empirical evidence suggests that the liquidation of assets by
distressed ﬁr m sc a no c c u ra t” ﬁre sale” prices (Pulvino, 1998); in other words, outside buyers
are able to purchase distressed assets at prices below fundamental values. Yet, the prevailing
view is that the ineﬃciency of ﬁre sales depend on the ex-post eﬃciency of the outcome,
not the division of the bargaining surplus. Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2001) argue
that auctions may be ineﬃcient because the assets may be sold to an ex-post ineﬃcient user.
Shleifer and Vishny (1992) ﬁnd similar ex-post social losses from ﬁre sales and an ex-ante cost
through lower debt capacity. Baird (1993), however, suggests that a ﬁre-sale auction to an
eﬃcient buyer may be preferred to a delayed bankruptcy sale at a higher price because the
latter involves deadweight bankruptcy costs. The following result ﬁnds a diﬀerent justiﬁcation
for the suboptimality of ﬁre sales, which does not rely on liquidity constrained outside buyers
or information asymmetries:
Proposition 8 (Sub-optimality of ﬁre sale) In an optimal contract, η =1 ;reorganization
laws that beneﬁt the outside buyer are ineﬃcient.
The result in Proposition 8 is straightforward given that the contract is written between
the ﬁrm and the creditor; setting η higher simply serves to limit the surplus of the outside
buyer, who is not part of the contract at time zero. This proposition also holds, however, if a
social planner chooses the parameters of the reorganization law and takes the outside buyer’s
ex-post surplus into account.13 If the creditor and the manager know ex-ante that a fraction
13If the outside buyer were part of the bargain at date 0, then η = 1 is not uniquely optimal since the
outside buyer could contribute part of the up-front investment cost K in exchange for his ex-post expected
surplus. The argument in Baird (1993) implicitly rests on this assumption, which would not be realistic in
most cases.
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a higher probability in order to be willing to lend. Because judges always make errors with
some probability, this will result in greater liquidation of good managers. Since liquidation
of good ﬁr m si si n e ﬃcient, the optimal contract makes this liquidation probability as small as
possible.
The intuition behind this result diﬀers from the ex-ante cost described in Shleifer and
Vishny (1992). In their model, excessively low prices in ﬁre sales lead ﬁrms to choose less
debt in their capital structure, to allow existing management to retain control in low states.
The cost of outside equity is the inability to prevent ineﬃcient investment in good states. In
our model, outside equity ﬁnance is not feasible because only a liquidation threat can ensure
repayment. The ex-ante ineﬃciency occurs because the ﬁrm must issue greater liquidation
rights to the creditor to counteract the lost surplus to the outside buyer. In this sense, our
model predicts that leverage will increase in anticipation of ﬁre sales rather than decrease.
The fact that the outside buyer and creditor always receive an expected payment of zero
in the optimal contract implies that ﬁrm proﬁt and social surplus are equivalent. The ﬁrm’s
proﬁt with the bankruptcy court resembles that of the benchmark case without the bankruptcy
court. The only diﬀerence is the liquidation probability, which has been replaced to βα, i.e.
the liquidation probability of the good type subject to the judicial error. The resulting
optimal reorganization law is summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 9 (Optimal Reorganization Law) The optimal contract sets η =1and the
liquidation probabilities upon receiving a good and a bad signal as follows.
a) (High-NPV project) When K/(ηy) < ∆α , βG =0and βB =
K/(ηy)
∆α .
b)(Low-NPV project) When K/(ηy) > ∆α , βG =
K/(ηy)−∆α
∆1−α and βB =1 .
where the coeﬃcients ∆α and ∆1−α are given by ∆α = θ(1−ϕ)
γ+η−γη
η (1−β)+θϕα+(1−
θ)ϕγα+(1−θ)(1−ϕ)(1−β),a n d∆1−α = θ(1−ϕ)
γ+η−γη
η β +θϕ(1−α)+(1−θ)ϕγ(1−α)+
(1 − θ)(1 − ϕ)β.
Intuitively, when the project has high NPV (speciﬁcally, low K), it is easy to make the
creditor’s participation constraint bind, which requires less liquidation of good ﬁrms. Hence,
in this case, the judge saves all ﬁrms receiving the good signal and liquidates with positive
probability upon receiving the bad signal. However, for low-NPV projects, it is diﬃcult to
satisfy the creditor’s participation constraint, so the optimal law becomes more pro-creditor:
all ﬁrms receiving a bad signal are liquidated and good signal ﬁrms are continued only prob-
abilistically.
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non-court cases, the following conclusion can be made.
Proposition 10 If access to the court is costless, then (ΠF)C > (ΠF)NC,where (ΠF)C is the
ﬁrm’s proﬁt under the optimal reorganization law and (ΠF)NC is the ﬁrm’s proﬁtu n d e rt h e
optimal private liquidation law; i.e. the ﬁrm’s optimal reorganization policy generates greater
proﬁt than the optimal private liquidation policy.
This result follows from the fact that the court-based procedure allows for greater ﬂexi-
bility regarding ex-post decisions that the private solution does not provide. It should be
noted that this result holds despite the fact that the bankruptcy judge has inferior informa-
tion regarding the cash ﬂow and the ex-post type of the manager. It assumes, however,
that the ﬁrm tailors the characteristics of the reorganization law to optimally suit its char-
acteristics. In the following section we will consider the more realistic case in which the
law sets a single policy and ﬁrms choose between a privately-contracted liquidation law and
a legally imposed reorganization law that involves judicial discretion but is invariant to ﬁrm
characteristics. For now, we consider these ﬁrm-speciﬁc characteristics to understand how
the optimal reorganization law can vary across ﬁrms.
Proposition 11 When reorganization laws are set optimally,
∂βα
∂θ < 0 and
∂βα
∂K > 0; the
optimal law for a given ﬁrm is more creditor-friendly when
a) the NPV is lower (higher K), and
b) cash ﬂows are riskier (lower θ, holding θx constant).
Intuitively, part (a) of the proposition is straightforward. For higher NPV projects (when
K is lower), the creditor requires a smaller repayment to satisfy his participation constraint.
Since judicial error always results in liquidation of some eﬃcient types, the liquidation prob-
ability in the optimal contract is set as small as possible such that the creditor is willing to
extend funds at date 0. A lower K thus implies lower liquidation probabilities for the ﬁrm.
Part (b) of the proposition can be understood as follows. Keeping the net present value
θx+y−K constant, a riskier ﬁrm implies larger x and smaller θ. The incentive for strategic
default is greater for the high-risk, high-return ﬁrm because the default decision is made after
the return is realized. Holding θx constant, the high-risk ﬁrm realizes a greater cash ﬂow
than the low-risk ﬁrm when it succeeds. The manager’s incentive to repay, however, is driven
only by the threat to seize his future expected cash ﬂo w ,w h i c hi st h es a m ef o rb o t hﬁrms.
The increased diﬃculty of enforcing repayment for riskier projects implies that the creditor
must have a stronger liquidation threat to enforce greater repayment.
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The growing empirical literature on investor protection around the world, starting with La
Porta, Lopez-de-Silanez, Shleifer, and Vishny (1997, 1998), ﬁnd that the degree of legal protec-
tion of investors, in particular, the pro-creditor features of bankruptcy laws, have a signiﬁcant
positive impact on the development of capital markets. As we will show, however, the optimal
degree of creditor protection in a country’s reorganization law should also adapt itself endoge-
nously to other characteristics of the legal environment. It is this adaptation to the legal
environment that may be creating the wide diﬀerence in the level of pro-creditor/pro-debtor
policies reﬂected in the reorganization law among diﬀerent countries as reported by Claessens
and Klapper (2002).
We ﬁrst examine the impact of judicial error on the optimal reorganization policy. Many
developing countries have recently passed bankruptcy laws that require judical expertise to
implement; for example, Japan introduced only recently a reorganization law (Civil Rehabilita-
tion Law) for medium and small sized businesses which requires signiﬁcant judicial discretion,
including the ability to dismiss management and lift a stay on debt collection (Wagatsuma,
2001). We would expect that the inexperience of judges would have an important impact on
the eﬃciency of outcomes. Less obvious, however, is the way the characteristics of the law
should optimally adjust to account for judicial fallibility. The following proposition shows
how the judicial error impacts reorganization law.
Proposition 12 (The Eﬀect of Judicial Eﬃciency)
∂βα
∂α > 0 and
∂βα
∂β > 0;a st h ec o u r t
becomes more eﬀective (less eﬀective), the optimal law becomes more debtor-friendly (creditor
friendly).
Intuitively, the decision to allow good ﬁrms to survive over creditor objection brings an
ex-post eﬃciency beneﬁt and a cost, namely that the creditor’s participation constraint is
more diﬃcult to satisfy. Judicial error, both in favor of debtors and in favor of creditors,
increases the cost of attempting to save the eﬃcient but unlucky manager. As error of
either type increases, keeping βα (the true liquidation probability of the good types) constant
necessarily requires a lower ββ : a greater fraction of bad managers will also retain control.
This is not feasible, however, since the creditor’s participation constraint would no longer be
satisﬁe d . T h i si m p l i e st h a tβα must rise in order to preserve the creditor’s willingness to lend
in equilibrium when judicial error of either type is higher.
This brings up a related corollary:
Corollary 13 Social surplus decreases with judicial errors α and β.
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liquidating good managers, βα. Hence, social surplus decreases with both types of error.
We should point out that the idea behind this proposition has had a large impact on
the development of bankruptcy law in practice. In U.S. law, the interpretation of the new
value exception, which allows absolute priority to be violated when equity owners contribute
new value, has depended in large part on the perceived (in)ability of judges to quantify the
eﬃciency gains of leaving existing management in place. Baird (1986) notes that in a Supreme
Court case in 1939, Justice William Douglas ruled that the expertise of an owner-manager did
not constitute new value because of the inherent diﬃculty in estimating the expected value
of the owner-manager’s contributions. The current state of U.S. bankruptcy law, however,
takes more of an intermediate approach which, in essence, gives owner-managers an option to
retain equity in their ongoing ﬁrms in exchange for new value.14
Now, we turn our attention to the eﬀect of legal enforcement of debt contracts on the
reorganization law. In order to model the quality of legal enforcement, assume that a small
fraction15, ρ, of the second period cash ﬂow is veriﬁable. Figuratively, ρ reﬂects each country’s
quality of contractual enforcement. As enforcement improves, the creditor can claim a larger
portion of the manager’s future cash ﬂows as payment in lieu of liquidating the project. This,
in turn, allows for a lower probability of liquidation, which is proportional to the eﬃciency
loss of the contract.
Following similar arguments as in the previous section, the incentive compatibility con-
dition for the good type becomes Rx ≤ ρy +( η − ρ)βαy, and the incentive compatibility
condition for the bad type becomes Rx ≤ ρY +( 1− ρ)ββY . It is optimal to allow strategic
default for the good types and collect more from the bad types. The ex-ante expected proﬁt
of the ﬁrm, the creditor, and the outside buyer are given by,
ΠF = θ{ϕ[x +( 1− βα)(1 − ρ)y + βα(1 − η)y]+( 1− ϕ)[x − Rx + Y ]}
+(1 − θ){ϕ(1 − βα)(1 − ρ)y +( 1− ϕ)(1 − ββ)(1 − ρ)Y }
ΠC = θ{ϕ[(1 − βα)ρy + βαηy]+( 1− ϕ)Rx} +( 1− θ){ϕ[(1 − βα)ρy + βαηγy]
14For a more thorough discussion of this issue, see Skeel (2001). The new value exception currently appears
to be ill-deﬁned, but is geared toward allowing owner-managers to retain an interest in their ﬁrms.
15We assume small ρ, because we are interested only in comparative statics near nonveriﬁable second period
cashﬂow. i.e. a perturbation analysis near nonveriﬁable second period cashﬂow. For large ρ,g o o dI Ca n d
bad IC are aﬀected and the analysis becomes more involved.
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ΠB = θ{(1 − ϕ)(1 − η)(1 − γ)y} +( 1− θ){ϕβα(1 − η)γy
+(1 − ϕ)[(1 − ββ)(1 − η)(1 − γ)y + ββ(1 − η)y]}
The total social surplus, which is again equal to the ﬁrm’s proﬁt, reduces to
ΠS = θx + y − K − βα(1 − θ)ϕ(1 − γ)y
As can be seen from above, the mathematical form of social surplus is unchanged by the
introduction of a small fraction of veriﬁable second period cash ﬂow, and the social loss is
incurred when the judge rules to liquidate the good manager upon liquidity default. The
optimal value of βα, however, is smaller as ρ increases, because the increased transfer from
the ﬁrm to the creditor by the veriﬁable second period cash ﬂow reduces the need to liquidate.
This results in the following proposition:
Proposition 14 (The Eﬀect of Legal Enforcement)
∂βα
∂ρ < 0; the optimal “debtor-friendliness”
of the bankruptcy law depends positively on the degree of enforcement (ρ).
As mentioned earlier, better enforcement implies that creditor protection can be satisﬁed
without converting the assets to cash in bankruptcy. Thus, the optimal policy can focus
more on ex-post eﬃciency, which a more pro-debtor policy allows.
4.3 Reorganization Laws With Heterogeneous Types
In the previous sections, we have implicitly taken the approach that ﬁrms and creditors could
specify the terms of the reorganization law, namely the liquidation probabilities βG and βB,
to maximize the eﬃciency of the contract given the ﬁrm’s characteristics (K, θ, x, y)a n dt h e
exogenous characteristics of the environment (ρ and the error probabilities α and β). In doing
so, we are able to understand the characteristics that drive optimal reorganization laws. In
practice, of course, ﬁrms are restricted in their ability to tailor their own insolvency procedure.
Since the optimal liquidation probabilities are dependent on ﬁrm characteristics, it may be
the case that a given procedure is better suited for some ﬁrms than others. The ﬁrms for
which the reorganization law is poorly suited may instead opt for private solutions to distress,
as we modeled in Section 2, rather than submit to an inappropriate legal procedure.
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design problem when the law cannot be conditioned on individual ﬁrm characteristics. We
ﬁrst consider the ﬁrm’s choice over whether or not to use a reorganization law with a given set
of characteristics. We then consider the problem of a social planner who sets the terms of the
law to maximize social surplus. This will shed light on the optimal scope of the bankruptcy
law: should a court-based reorganization procedure be aimed at all ﬁrms, or only a subset for
which the law is most valuable?
4.4 Screening under Exogenous (Suboptimal) Reorganization Law
In this subsection, we turn our focus to the ﬁrm’s side of the problem: given a law with
ﬁxed liquidation probabilities βG and βB,w h i c hﬁrms will choose to ”contract in” to the
reorganization law and which ﬁrms will ”contract out” and resolve their distress privately? To
examine this question, we allow ﬁrms to diﬀer along the dimension K, the startup investment
cost required of the creditor. We assume a continuum of NPV projects, K ∈ [K,K]. For a
ﬁrm with a given project NPV, i.e. given K, the reorganization law, e.g. f βG and g βB,m a yn o t
be optimal16. Given the additional beneﬁt of conditioning the outcome on the judge’s signal,
however, it may still be the case that resolving distress according to the (suboptimal) court-
based procedure is more beneﬁcial than resolving distress outside court. However, as the
discrepancy between the ideal optimal bankruptcy law and the actual suboptimal bankruptcy
law increases, the ﬁrm will beneﬁt more by avoiding the bankruptcy court. While it is
diﬃcult to completely characterize the court/no court decision for any given βG and βB pair,
it is straightforward to characterize the ﬁrms that will not use a given law, because it does
not protect creditors adequately. In what follows, we assume that bargaining power is set
optimally at η =1 .
Lemma 15 Let f βG(f K) and g βB(f K) be an optimal reorganization law for a ﬁrm with startup
cost f K. Then a necessary condition for ﬁrms to choose the court-based reorganization law to
resolve distress under the policy { f βG(f K),g βB(f K)} is given by K ≤ f K.
Lemma 15 t e l l su st h a t ,f o raﬁxed reorganization law, the lower NPV ﬁrms (high-K ﬁrms)
will choose private distress resolution. For these ﬁrms, the law is too debtor-friendly to be
sustainable; i.e. the creditor must be given more protection in the form of a higher liquidation
probability in order to be willing to extend credit at date 0. In essence, the prospect of date
16We assume that this reorganization law is optimal for some type of ﬁrm, which requires initial investment
e K.
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ﬂows when the ﬁrm succeeds. When this purchase price is not feasible, due to the strategic
default motive, the ﬁrm must provide for greater protection of creditors through liquidation
rights in default. Since we are interested in world-wide variation of reorganization laws, it
would be of interest how this infeasible region changes across countries with diﬀerent judicial
eﬃciency, α and β, and degree of enforcement, ρ, which is stated in the following proposition.
Proposition 16 The infeasible region of the reorganization law is expanding with increasing
type II error, β, and is contracting with increasing type I error, α, and increasing level of
enforcement, ρ.
It is straightforward to see that as the signal error in favor of ﬁrms β rises, it is more
diﬃcult to sustain funding with court resolution of distress, since this implies less eﬃcient
identiﬁcation of the good ﬁrms and less protection for creditors. With respect to the error in
favor of creditors, α, Lemma 15 shows that when the reorganization law is written optimally,
both types of error are welfare-destroying. When the law is set suboptimally, however, a
judicial bias in favor of creditors can compensate for an excessively debtor-friendly policy,
thus making the law available for a greater subset of ﬁrms. Our predictions are consistent
with the empirical ﬁndings by Claessens and Klapper (2002) in that bankruptcy usage rates
are greater for countries with better enforcement capability.
4.5 The Optimal Scope of Bankruptcy
In this subsection, we consider a social planner’s problem of choosing a single reorganization
law to maximize social surplus, given that ﬁrms can choose whether to contract in or out of
the procedure at date 0. To model the problem in a simple fashion, suppose there are two
types of ﬁrms which diﬀer only on the required startup cost K.A f r a c t i o n λ of the ﬁrms are
high NPV projects that require initial investment of KL, and the remaining 1−λ fraction have
low NPV projects that require an initial investment of KH,w h e r eKH >K L. We assume that
the social planner who designs the law knows λ, but the bankruptcy judge cannot observe
each individual ﬁrm’s startup cost.
In this scenario, the social planner can try to optimize the reorganization law such that
both NPV types will choose to use the law, which we term pooling,o rh ec a ntarget the law
to a subset of ﬁrms, letting the rest of the ﬁrms resolve distress outside of bankruptcy. It
can be shown that to induce both KL-a n dKH-ﬁrms to choose bankruptcy court, the judge
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Figure 2: Optimal Scope of the Bankruptcy Law: Pooling vs. Targeting
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Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Pressneeds to set the rules as if he is targeting for the low NPV ﬁrm (i.e. KH-ﬁrm)17.T h u s , t h e
eﬀective choice is between pooling and targeting only the high-NPV types. Then the social





















S (KH) is the social surplus of the KH-ﬁrm under pooling, ΠPool
S (KL)i st h es o c i a l
surplus of the KL-ﬁrm under pooling, ΠNC
S (KH) is the social surplus of KH-ﬁrm under no-
court, and Π
TL
S (KL) is the social surplus of the KL-ﬁrm under KL-ﬁrm targeting. Figure 2
shows an example of the social planner’s choice between pooling and targeting. As can be seen
in the ﬁgure, the social planner prefers pooling when the NPV of KL-a n dKH-ﬁrms are small,
but prefers targeting high NPV ﬁrm when the NPV diﬀerence is large. For convenience, let
us denote the value of KL, while keeping KH ﬁxed, that makes the judge indiﬀerent between
















So, the judge prefers pooling for those industries where KL>KJ
L (for ﬁxed KH), and prefers
targeting when KL<KJ
L (for ﬁxed KH). Figure 2 is a special case for a given degree of judicial
error (α = β =0 .05). Figure 3 shows a plot of KJ
Lsf o rr a n g eo ff e a s i b l ev a l u e so fj u d i c i a l
error, where the x-axis is the NPV diﬀerence between two types of ﬁrms (i.e. high NPV and
low NPV ﬁrms), and the y-axis is the total amount of judicial error, i.e. α+β. The amount
of judicial error can be considered as a country speciﬁc variable, where the small judicial error
may represent countries with more experienced judges and bankruptcy professionals, such
17This results because the ﬁrm’s proﬁt and Good IC and Bad IC take the same funtional form for both
high- and low-NPV ﬁrms. The only diﬀerence between these two types of ﬁrms lies in the creditor’s proﬁt,
where for high-NPV ﬁrm we need to subtract KL from creditor’s expected revenue, and KH for the low NPV
ﬁrm. If the judge sets the liquidation probabilites, βG and βB, to satisfy high NPV creditor’s IR, but not
enough for low NPV creditor’s IR, then pooling will not be achieved, because the creditor of the low NPV
ﬁrm will not lend money at date 0 for the contract that commits to involve the bankruptcy court. Hence,
pooling implies targeting for the low-NPV ﬁrm. Extending this model to continuum of NPV-projects, say
K∈ [K,K], then pooling implies targeting to the lowest NPV ﬁrm (i.e. K-ﬁrm).
18The existence of the point KJ
L is a straightforward result from Proposition 10 and Proposition 11,a n dt h e
proof is available from the authors upon request.
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Figure 3: Targeting Map: Judicial Eﬃciency vs. Industry Characteristics
as United States, and large judicial error may represent countries with a shorter history of
case law and less experienced professionals, such as Japan under its new civil rehabilitation
law. From Figure 3, we can see that for a given NPV diﬀerence, pooling is optimal when
judicial error is small, and targeting is optimal when judicial error is large. Thus, in countries
adopting new laws, we ﬁnd that contracts are optimally enhanced by a reorganization law
that has more limited scope; in other words, we should expect that a smaller fraction of ﬁrms
will use the law to resolve distress, and these ﬁrms will be the most proﬁtable from an ex-ante
standpoint.
5 Conclusions
The goal of this paper is to examine the ways in which optimal bankruptcy laws depend on the
legal environment, speciﬁcally on the quality of contract enforcement and the experience and
abililty of the judicial system. Empirical literature in law and ﬁnance increasingly recognizes
a distinction between the quality of the legal code and the quality of enforcement, both of
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demonstrating that these factors are not independent. Simply stated, “one size does not
ﬁt all” with respect to the optimal bankruptcy law. The creditor protection features of
bankruptcy laws are more important when enforcement quality and judicial experience are
l o w . A st h e s ef a c t o r si m p r o v e ,t h el a wc a nt a k eamore debtor-friendly approach in allowing
“honest but unlucky” managers to remain in control of their ﬁrms, preventing ineﬃcient
liquidations that would otherwise occur.
In a more general sense, our model explains why a court-based bankruptcy procedure can
add value to contracts when private liquidation procedures are also available. Contracting
parties anticipate that creditors will have an ex-post liquidation bias, which occurs in our
model because future cash ﬂows are diﬃcult to verify. The creditor, if given control, would
prefer to sell the assets to a less eﬃcient manager who is not wealth constrained. If a third
party, such as a judge, can verify the manager’s quality with some regularity, the court can
“complete an incomplete contract” by allowing managers to keep the ﬁrm’s assets when they
are identiﬁed as eﬃcient. Doing so, of course, can be costly. Allowing managers to retain
control of assets weakens creditors’ desire to fund new projects. If the bankruptcy law is too
debtor-friendly; i.e. creditors are not given suﬃcient liquidation rights, our model ﬁnds that
more ﬁrms will write contracts that avoid the law and rely on less ﬂexible private mechanisms.
Thus, we expect that debtor-friendly laws will be counterproductive in countries where investor
protection is poor, but can be eﬀective in countries with better investor protection and more
eﬀective courts. We also ﬁnd that from a legal design perspective, the number of ﬁrms
using the court-based procedure depends on judicial eﬃciency. For a less-experienced judicial
system, court-based bankruptcy should target a smaller subset of distressed ﬁrms for which
ex-post discretion is most valuable. As court experience improves, the law can take a broader
role relative to private liquidations.
For future research, one important issue we have not examined in depth is the forces
that aﬀect the choice of bankruptcy laws. While we expect that the laws in place will
reﬂect eﬃciency concerns to some degree, there are obviously more factors at work, including
interest group politics, the eﬀect of competition among competing states, and potentially the
country’s legal origin. An interesting question in this regard is whether common law systems,
which rely heavily on judicial interpretation and precedent, are more eﬀective at producing
convergence toward optimality compared to civil law systems which rely more heavily on legal
code. We also leave open a thorough examination of the industry-level variation in the uses of
bankruptcy vs. private distress resolution. In high-tech startups, for example, venture capital
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the recent high-tech failures did not use bankruptcy to wind up their operations or attempt
reorganization under court supervision. Our model predicts that such outcomes are more
likely for ﬁrms with riskier cash ﬂows when the law is too debtor-friendly. A more complete
empirical test of this prediction would be an interesting application of this model.
6 Appendix
6.1 Motivation for Judicial Error: Dynamic Complete Contracts
In this section, we motivate the need for judicial error in modeling bankruptcy procedures.
Although, there have been a large number of papers that studied bankruptcy, and more
speciﬁcally, Chapter 11, very rarely, did those papers considered the possibility of judicial error
in bankruptcy court’s decision making process19. However, as we will show in this section,
judicial error is an inevitable feature, when there is informational asymmetry between the
bankruptcy court and the insolvent borrower. i.e. the judge of the bankruptcy court cannot
completely eliminate the judicial error, and always faces a trade-oﬀ between punishing an
innocent victim (i.e. liquidating the proﬁtable project) and failing to punish a guilty agent
(i.e. saving worthless project). Hence, it is unlikely that these judicial errors will disappear
by smart choices of bankruptcy procedures. Rather, the choice of bankruptcy procedure will
often be a trade-oﬀ between type I and type II errors.
In order to link the length of the exclusivity period and the judicial error, we introduce a
dynamic valuation model that is similar to that by Francois and Morellec (2002), where they
modeled the exclusivity period of the automatic stay procedure as a Parisian option. i.e. the
judge rules to liquidate the ﬁrm if the value of ﬁrm’s asset stays below the default boundary
consecutively for pre-speciﬁed exclusivity period. Their model, however, considers homoge-
neous ﬁrms, and therefore the automatic stay does not contribute to providing additional
information regarding the ﬁrm’s characteristics, rather this procedure provides a grace period
for the ﬁrm and let it give more chance to escape the default region by luck. One of the
reason why the court is willing to provide an automatic stay procedure is to learn more about
the ﬁrm’s ﬁnancial viability during this automatic stay period, before making the liquidation
decision. In this section, we generalize Francois and Morellec (2002)’s model by introducing
19Notable exception is Chen and Sundaresan (2003).
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Figure 4: Passive Filtering of Heterogeneous Projects by Automatic Stay
ﬁrms that have heterogeneous projects, and thereby, providing motivation for the existence
of automatic stay period from a social surplus maximizer point of view. To minimize the
complexity of analysis and address the point of interest, we allow each ﬁrm to be either good
or bad, depending on their asset and cash ﬂow generating characteristics. Under real mea-
sure, both the good and the bad ﬁrms’ asset value follow a geometric Brownian motion with
identical diﬀusion coeﬃcient, σ, but have diﬀerent drift coeﬃcient, µG for good ﬁrm and µB
for bad ﬁrm, where µG >µ B
20. Assuming that the bad ﬁrm’s growth is too small, and is not
worth to keep running, the judge of the bankruptcy court, who is a social surplus maximizer,
wants to liquidate bad ﬁrms but wants to keep the good ﬁrm. However, the judge of the
bankruptcy court cannot observe the ﬁrm’s type, and therefore, needs to devise a mechanism
that allows the judge to identify each ﬁrm’s type from the signal generated by the mecha-
nism. One such mechanism is the automatic stay, where, upon default, the bankruptcy court
mandates the ﬁrm’s asset to stay within the ﬁrm for a pre-speciﬁed exclusivity period. If the
ﬁrm cannot rise above the default boundary during this exclusivity period, the judge rules to
20i.e. good project’s asset follows dVt = µGVtdt + σVtdWt, whereas bad project’s asset follows dVt =
µGVtdt + σVtdWt.
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http://law.bepress.com/alea/14th/art19liquidate the ﬁrm, and if the ﬁrm rises above the default boundary, the judge rules to resume
normal operation and save the ﬁrm. Since the good ﬁrm has higher drift coeﬃcient than
the bad ﬁrm, it is more likely to rise above the default boundary upon reaching the default
boundary. Figure 4 shows an example of such procedure. The upper path is the asset
value of the good ﬁrm, and the lower path is that of the bad ﬁrm. Upon hitting the default
boundary, the good ﬁrm eventually rises above the default boundary, but the bad ﬁrm never
m a k e si to v e rt h ed e f a u l tb o u n d a r ya n di ss h u t d o w na tt h ee x p i r a t i o no ft h ee x c l u s i v i t yp e -
riod. Hence, by observing whether the ﬁrm reaches over the default boundary or stays below
the default boundary consecutively during the exclusivity period can provide a signal for the
judge regarding the ﬁrm’s type. This signal is, however, imperfect, and the judge can make
errors by making inferences regarding the ﬁrm’s type using this signal. Speciﬁcally, for given
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2πex2/2N(x), and N(x) is
the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal distribution21.S i n c eΦ(·)i sa n
increasing function in its argument, α decreases for increasing exclusivity period, d,a n dβ
increases with increasing exclusivity period, which is shown in Figure 5. As can be seen in
the ﬁgure, the total amount of judicial error cannot be arbitrarily reduced, and is a trade-oﬀ
between the type I and the type II errors. The optimal length of the exclusivity period can
be found by minimizing the expected welfare loss incurred by type I error, and that of the
type II error. i.e. the social surplus maximizing judge of the bankruptcy court ex-ante sets
the length of the exclusivity period as,
d =a r gm i n {cGα + cBβ}
21This result is an adaptation from Francois and Morellec (2002)’s Parisian option model of automatic stay
for an economy with homogeneous projects. In their paper, they ﬁnd the probability of liquidation of a ﬁrm
with value process, dVt =( r − δ)Vtdt + σVtdW
Q





d ,w h e r eb =
µ−δ−σ2/2
σ .I n
our model, we have two possible projects with drifts µG and µB, and the type I error is the probability of
liquidating the good project, α = PL(d,µG), and the type II error is the probability of not liquidating the bad
project, β =1− PL(d,µB).
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Figure 5: Judicial Error vs. Length of the Automatic Stay
where cG is the welfare loss incurred by liquidating a good ﬁrm, and cB is the welfare loss
incurred by saving a bad ﬁrm22.
Using the dynamic model, one can proceed to ﬁnd the value of the ﬁrm and the value of
the debt and the equity for each type of ﬁrm. However, it is often the case that the dynamic
feature, although useful, is not essential in the main economic reasoning, and it would be
possible to reduce the complexity of the analysis, while maintaining the economic intuition by
using a static model instead of a dynamic model, which is done in the main text of this paper.
As an example of how such conversion from dynamic to static model can be done, we take the
case of converting dynamic complete contract to a static complete contract23.T h e c a s h ﬂow
in a dynamic model is modeled as a geometric Brownian motion, dVt =( r−δ)Vtdt+σVtdWt,
22In this paper, we are not focusing on speciﬁc attributes of the welfare loss. Hence, we exogenously denoted
the cost as cG and cB, but it is straightforward to endogenize these costs using ﬁrm’s cashﬂow characteristics.
For example, the cost of liquidating a good ﬁrm, cG,c a nb et h ed i s c o u n t e dp r e s e n tv a l u eo ff u t u r ec a s h ﬂow
stream, and the cost of saving the bad ﬁrm, cB, can be the discounted future cashﬂow stream of the bad
project less the cost of ﬁnancial distress.
23Note that in the main text, the model was a static incomplete contract, which is diﬀe r e n tf r o mw h a tw e
discuss in this section. The dynamic version of incomplete contract with geometric Brownian motion cashﬂow
requires much more involve analysis, and is delegated as a future work.
30
http://law.bepress.com/alea/14th/art19while in a static model it can be modeled as discrete output, e y ∈ {yH,y L},w h e r eyH >y L.
The heterogeneous proﬁtability of the projects are modeled as diﬀerent drift coeﬃcient in
a dynamic model, i.e. µ ∈ {µG,µ B}, whereas it is modeled as diﬀerent probability of high
outcome, i.e. Pr(e y = yH)=θG for the good project and Pr(e y = yH)=θB for the bad
project, in a static version. Finally, the judicial error is expressed in terms of the liquidation










d) , while it
is exogenously given as type I and type II error, i.e. Pr(sG|θG)=1− α, Pr(sB|θG)=α,
Pr(sG|θB)=β, Pr(sB|θB)=1− β, in a static setting. Based on the results of the dynamic
model of this section, however, we know that the type I and the type II errors are linked with
the length of the exclusivity period, d, and one type of error cannot be reduced arbitrarily
small without increasing the other. In the discrete model, we assume that the total amount
of judicial error, α + β, is constant for a given ex-ante market distribution of ﬁrm types.
6.2 Proofs of Lemmas and Propositions
Lemma 1 (Bolton and Scharfstein, 1996) In an optimal contract, βx =0and R0 =0 .
Proof. Although, the model in this paper is slightly diﬀerent, the main argument of
this proof follows the same logic as in that of Bolton and Scharfstein (1996). First, βx is
zero, because if it were strictly positive, then the ﬁrm can oﬀer an alternative contract with
smaller βx and larger Rx that makes creditor IR unchanged, but makes ﬁrm strictly better oﬀ.
Speciﬁcally, if βx is not zero, then the ﬁrm can oﬀer an alternative contract that decreases βx
by a small amount ²,a n di n c r e a s e sRx,b y²ηy. Such contract will still satisfy the creditor
IR, i.e. ΠC ≥ 0, while making the ﬁrm strictly better oﬀ, i.e. ΠF = ²γ(1 − η)y>0. We can
continue this logic till βx becomes zero. Hence, in an optimal contract, βx is zero. Similar
argument can be applied to show R0 = 0 at optimum. If it were not, then the ﬁrm can
oﬀer an alternative contract that has lower β0 and larger R0, while keeping the creditor IR
unchanged. As β0 decreases, the fraction of the outside buyer’s proﬁt from the total amount
of social surplus decreases, and the total amount of social surplus itself increases. Hence,
the ﬁrm’s proﬁti n c r e a s e sb yo ﬀering such alternative contract, while leaving the creditor
indiﬀerent. Again, we can continue this logic till R0 becomes zero. Therefore, in an optimal
contract, R0 =0 .
Lemma 2 (Optimality of Strategic Default) Given the model and assumptions states
above, if η < 1, then the optimal contract chosen by a proﬁt maximizing ﬁrm allows strategic
default, and the creditors will make zero expected proﬁt under this contract. If η =1 ,n o
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Proof. Remind that the good IC and the bad IC are
R
g
x ≤ (β0 − βx)ηy
R
b
x ≤ (β0 − βx)Y
Also notice that if η < 1, the upper bound of the good IC, (β0 − βx)ηy, is smaller than that
of the bad IC, (β0 − βx)Y , because (β0 − βx)ηy − (β0 − βx)Y =( β0 − βx)γ(1 − η)y>0.
Hence, if the good IC is binding, the bad IC is automatically satisﬁed with a slack, whereas
if the bad IC is binding, the good IC is not satisﬁed. As a result, when the good IC binds,
the ﬁrm’s, the creditor’s, and the outside buyer’s proﬁt becomes
ΠF = θ{ϕ[x − R
g
x +( 1− βx)y + βx(1 − η)y]+( 1− ϕ)[x − R
g
x +( 1− βx)Y
+βx(1 − η)0]} +( 1− θ){ϕ[(1 − β0)y + β00] + (1 − ϕ)[(1 − β0)Y + β00]}
ΠC = θ{ϕ[R
g
x +( 1− βx)0 + βxηy]+( 1− ϕ)[R
g
x +( 1− βx)0 + βxηy]}
+(1 − θ){ϕ[(1 − β0)0 + β0ηγy]+( 1− ϕ)[(1 − β0)0 + β0ηy]} − K
ΠB = θ{ϕ[(1 − βx)0 + βx0] + (1 − ϕ)[(1 − βx)(1 − η)(1 − γ)y + βx(1 − η)y]}
+(1 − θ){ϕ[(1 − β0)0 + β0(1 − η)γy]+( 1− ϕ)[(1 − β0)(1 − η)(1 − γ)y
+β0(1 − η)y]}
When the bad IC binds, however, the good type (managers) will strategically default, and the
proﬁto fe a c ha g e n tb e c o m e s ,
ΠF = θ{ϕ[x − R0 +( 1− β0)y + β0(1 − η)y]+( 1− ϕ)[x − R
b
x +( 1− βx)Y
+βx(1 − η)0]} +( 1− θ){ϕ[(1 − β0)y + β00] + (1 − ϕ)[(1 − β0)Y + β00]}
ΠC = θ{ϕ[R0 +( 1− β0)0 + β0ηy]+( 1− ϕ)[R
b
x +( 1− βx)0 + βxηy]}
+(1 − θ){ϕ[(1 − β0)0 + β0ηγy]+( 1− ϕ)[(1 − β0)0 + β0ηy]} − K
ΠB = θ{ϕ[(1 − βx)0 + βx0] + (1 − ϕ)[(1 − βx)(1 − η)(1 − γ)y + βx(1 − η)y]}
+(1 − θ){ϕ[(1 − β0)0 + β0(1 − η)γy]+( 1− ϕ)[(1 − β0)(1 − η)(1 − γ)y
+β0(1 − η)y]}
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C −ΠGoodIC
C = θ(1−ϕ)(β0−βx)(Y −ηy) > 0, for
a ﬁxed β0. i.e. the creditor IR is easier to satisfy when bad IC binds. Since the creditor acts
competitively, the ﬁrm oﬀers a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer that makes creditor to break even. So,
under the bad IC binding, the liquidation probability, β0, is lower. Then, two eﬀects make
ﬁrm to prefer a contract that involves strategic default for the good type, i.e. bad IC binds.
First, the social surplus, ΠS = θx + y − K − β0(1 − θ)ϕ(1 − γ)y, increases as β0 decreases.
Second, outside buyer’s proﬁt decreases, which in turn increases ﬁrm’s proﬁt for given total
social surplus, as β0 decreases. Therefore, in equilibrium, the bad IC binds, and the good
types strategically default upon seeing ﬁrst period cash ﬂow x.I f η = 1, then good IC and
bad IC coincides, and both types’ pay Rx upon seeing ﬁrst period cash ﬂow x. Hence, no
strategic default occurs in this case.
Proposition 3 (Optimal Contract without Bankruptcy Court) The optimal contract
{Rx,βx,R0,β0} are given as, Rx = β0Y , βx =0 , R0 =0 ,a n dβ0= K
ηy{θ[ϕ+(1−ϕ)(γ+η−ηγ)/η]+(1−θ)[ϕγ+(1−ϕ)]}.
Proof. First notice that at optimum, the creditor IR and bad IC is binding. To see
this, if creditor IR were not binding, then the ﬁrm, who makes a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer of a
contract, will be strictly better oﬀ by oﬀering an alternative contract that has lower β0,a n d
still satisﬁes creditor IR. i.e. ΠC ≥ 0 . A ss h o w ni nt h ep r o o fo fLemma 1, a contract with
lower β0 makes ﬁrm strictly better oﬀ and still induces creditors to participate. Hence, at
optimum, the ﬁrm will push β0 to the lowest limit, which is when creditor IR binds. Similar
logic applies in showing that if bad IC were not binding, then the ﬁrm can oﬀer an alternative
contract with lower β0 − βx
24, which, as before, will make the ﬁrm strictly better oﬀ while
still satisfying creditor IR. Continuing this logic, the bad IC is binding at optimum. Once
we showed that the creditor IR and the bad IC is binding, it is straightforward to get the
claimed result. i.e. β0 = K
ηy{θ[ϕ+(1−ϕ)(γ+η−ηγ)/η]+(1−θ)[ϕγ+(1−ϕ)]} can be derived from ΠC =0 ,
and Rx = β0Y is the bad IC when it is binding.
Proposition 4 (Liquidation Bias) Following a liquidity default, the creditor strictly
prefers liquidation to continuation.
Proof. The liquidation bias comes from the fact that the second period cash ﬂow is not
veriﬁable, and therefore, the incumbent manager of the ﬁrm cannot pledge this cash ﬂow
to the creditor in return for continuing the project. In such case, the creditor face two
choices upon liquidity default. Let the incumbent manager, either eﬃcient or ineﬃcient,
continue the project, or liquidate the project and sell it to the outside buyer, who may or
24Since βx =0 ,s m a l l e rβ0 − βx implies smaller β0.
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Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Pressmay not be eﬃcient. The creditor’s proﬁt from the former case is zero, whereas it is ηγy
when the outside buyer is ineﬃcient and it is ηy if the outside buyer is eﬃcient. Hence, the
self-interested creditor prefers to liquidate the project, even if the creditor knows that the
incumbent manager is eﬃcient and truly has no cash to payout (i.e. the creditor knows the
ﬁrm is in liquidity default and not strategic default).





discretion is unnecessary when the ﬁrm repays Rx.
Proof. There are two things to notice to derive the claimed result. First, when the
manager has cash, i.e. the realized ﬁrst period cash ﬂow is x, the allocation of the physical
asset between the manager and the creditor does not aﬀect the social surplus. Because, if the
incumbent manager has the asset and is eﬃcient, he will keep it, while if he is ineﬃcient the he
will sell the project to the eﬃcient outside buyer. Hence, no matter what type the manager
is, the project will end up in the hands of the eﬃcient agent. As will be shown in Lemma 7,
at optimum the bad IC is binding, and Rx is set to the maximum value that the ineﬃcient
(bad type) manager is willing to pay than strategically default when the ﬁrst period cash ﬂow
x. So, the bankruptcy court cannot increase Rx, and can only reduce or leave it unchanged.
If the court reduce Rx, the creditor, who marginally breaks even at the optimum25,g e t sw o r s e
oﬀ and demand higher liquidation probability, βα, to break even under the reduced Rx.T h i s
reduces the social surplus because ΠS = θx + y − K − βα(1 − θ)ϕ(1 − γ)y. Therefore, the
social surplus maximizing court leaves Rx unchanged. i.e. i.e. court chooses no action upon
receiving case from a solvent ﬁrm. Then the creditor and manager weakly prefer not to take
the case to the bankruptcy court when the ﬁrm admits high cash ﬂow in the ﬁrst period. If
there is a positive cost by taking the case to the court, the preference is strict.
Lemma 6 (Ordering of the Liquidation Probabilities) In any optimal contract, βG < βα <
β0 < ββ < βB
Proof. There are two possible cases to consider. One, when both the good and the bad




C = θβαηy +( 1− θ){ϕβαγηy +( 1− ϕ)ββηy} − K =0
Π
NoCourt
C = θβ0ηy +( 1− θ){ϕβ0γηy +( 1− ϕ)β0ηy} − K =0
25A l s ot ob es h o w ni nP r o p o s i t i o n8 .
26In the next lemma, we will show that in an optimal reorganization law, the case where both the good and
the bad IC binds is not optimal, and therefore, is ruled out.




C should also be zero. Rearranging terms gives
βα − β0 = −
(1 − θ)(1 − ϕ)
θ +( 1− θ)ϕγ
(ββ − β0)
Hence, when βα > β0,t h e nββ < β0, and vice versa. Since the social surplus maximizing
judge prefers to save the good type and prefers to liquidate the bad type, βG < βB
28.S i n c e
we assumed the errors are small, i.e. α < 1
2 and β < 1
2,w eh a v eβG < βα < ββ < βB.F r o m
above equation, therefore, we can conclude that βG < βα < β0 < ββ < βB.
When only the bad IC holds,
Π
Court
C = θϕβαηy + θ(1 − ϕ)ββY +( 1− θ){ϕβαγηy +( 1− ϕ)ββηy} − K =0
Π
NoCourt
C = θϕβ0ηy + θ(1 − ϕ)β0Y +( 1− θ){ϕβ0γηy +( 1− ϕ)β0ηy} − K =0
Again, subtracting ΠCourt
C from ΠNoCourt
C should also be zero. Rearranging terms gives
βα − β0 = −
{θ(η + γ − ηγ)/η +1− θ}(1 − ϕ)
ϕ{θ +( 1− θ)γ}
(ββ − β0)
Following the same logic as before, we get βG < βα < β0 < ββ < βB.
Lemma 7 (Optimality of Strategic Default) For all 0 ≤ η ≤ 1, good types strategically
default, and bad types repay in the optimal contract. Creditors make zero expected proﬁt.
Proof. Following similar algebra as in Lemma 2,w ec a ns h o wt h eu p p e rb o u n do ft h e
good IC is smaller than that of the bad IC, even if η = 1. i.e. ββY − βαηy =( ββ − βα)ηy +
γ(1−η)ββy>0. Hence, if the good IC is binding, the bad IC is automatically satisﬁed with
a slack, whereas if the bad IC is binding, the good IC is not satisﬁed. As a result, when the
good IC binds, the ﬁrm’s, the creditor’s, and the outside buyer’s proﬁtb e c o m e s
ΠF = θ{ϕ[x − Rx + y]+( 1− ϕ)[x − Rx + Y ]}
+(1 − θ){0 − R0 + ϕ[(1 − α)((1 − βG)y + βG0) + α((1 − βB)y + βB0)]
+(1 − ϕ)[β((1 − βG)Y + βG0) + (1 − β)((1 − βB)Y + βB0)]}
ΠC = θRx +( 1− θ){ϕ[R0 +( 1− α)βGηγy + αβBηγy]
+(1 − ϕ)[R0 + ββGηy +( 1− β)βBηy]} − K
28This can be formally shown, but will be skipped, because in Proposition 8 we will show this result for a
similar case where only bad IC holds.
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+(1 − θ){ϕ[(1 − α)βG(1 − η)γy + αβB(1 − η)γy]
+(1 − ϕ)[β((1 − βG)(1 − η)(1 − γ)y + βG(1 − η)y)
+(1 − β)((1 − βB)(1 − η)(1 − γ)y + βB(1 − η)y)]}
When the bad IC binds, however, the good type (managers) will strategically default, and the
proﬁt of each agents become,
ΠF = θ{ϕ[x − R0 +( 1− α)((1 − βG)y + βG(1 − η)y)+α((1 − βB)y
+βB(1 − η)y)] + (1 − ϕ)[x − Rx + Y ]} +( 1− θ){0 − R0
+ϕ[(1 − α)((1 − βG)y + βG0) + α((1 − βB)y + βB0)]
+(1 − ϕ)[β((1 − βG)Y + βG0) + (1 − β)((1 − βB)Y + βB0)]}
ΠC = θ{ϕ[R0 +( 1− α)βGηy + αβBηy]+( 1− ϕ)Rx}
+(1 − θ){ϕ[R0 +( 1− α)βGηγy + αβBηγy]
+(1 − ϕ)[R0 + ββGηy +( 1− β)βBηy]} − K
ΠB = θ{ϕ[(1 − α)0 + α0] + (1 − ϕ)(1 − η)(1 − γ)y}
+(1 − θ){ϕ[(1 − α)βG(1 − η)γy + αβB(1 − η)γy]
+(1 − ϕ)[β((1 − βG)(1 − η)(1 − γ)y + βG(1 − η)y)
+(1 − β)((1 − βB)(1 − η)(1 − γ)y + βB(1 − η)y)]}
Straightforward calculation show that ΠBadIC
C −ΠGoodIC
C = θ(1−ϕ)(ββY −βαηy) > 0, for ﬁxed
βG and βB. i.e. the creditor IR is easier to satisfy when bad IC binds. Since the creditor
acts competitively, the ﬁrm oﬀers a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer that makes creditor to break even.
So, under bad IC binding, the liquidation probability, βα, is lower. Then, two eﬀects make
ﬁrm to prefer a contract that involves strategic default for the good type, i.e. bad IC binds.
First, the social surplus, ΠS = θx + y − K − βα(1 − θ)ϕ(1 − γ)y,i n c r e a s e sa sβα decreases.
Second, outside buyer’s proﬁt decreases, which in turn increases ﬁrm’s proﬁt for given total
social surplus, as βα decreases. Therefore, in equilibrium, the bad IC binds, and the good
types strategically default upon seeing ﬁrst period cash ﬂow x. Notice that unlike Lemma 2,
even if η = 1, the bad IC is larger than the good IC. Therefore, no strategic default always
occurs in this case.
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schemes that beneﬁt the outside buyer are ineﬃcient29.
Proof. We need to show that ΠB = 0 at optimum. The outside buyer’s ex-ante expected
proﬁt, ΠB, is positive when η < 1, and is zero when η = 1. Since the optimal solution of η
of the judge’s social surplus maximization problem is η = 1, outside buyer’s ex-ante expected
proﬁt, ΠB,i sz e r oa to p t i m u m ,w h i c hw a st ob es h o w n .
Proposition 9 (Optimal Reorganization Law) The optimal contract sets η =1and the
liquidation probabilities upon receiving a good and a bad signal as follows.
a) (High-NPV project) When K/(ηy) < ∆α , βG =0a n dβB =
K/(ηy)
∆α .
b)(Low-NPV project) When K/(ηy) > ∆α , βG =
K/(ηy)−∆α
∆1−α and βB =1 .
where the coeﬃcients ∆α and ∆1−α are given by ∆α = θ(1−ϕ)
γ+η−γη
η (1−β)+θϕα+(1−
θ)ϕγα+(1−θ)(1−ϕ)(1−β), and ∆1−α = θ(1−ϕ)
γ+η−γη
η β +θϕ(1−α)+(1−θ)ϕγ(1−α)+
(1 − θ)(1 − ϕ)β.
Proof. Similar to Proposition 3, at optimum, the creditor IR and bad IC is binding. To
see this, if creditor IR were not binding, then the ﬁrm, who makes a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer
of a contract, will be strictly better oﬀ by oﬀering an alternative contract that has lower βα,
and still satisﬁes creditor IR. i.e. ΠC ≥ 0 . A ss h o w ni nt h ep r o o fo fLemma 1, a contract
with lower βα makes ﬁrm strictly better oﬀ and still induces creditors to participate. Hence,
at optimum, the ﬁrm will push βα to the lowest limit, which is when creditor IR binds.
Similar logic applies in showing that if bad IC were not binding, then the ﬁrm can oﬀer an
alternative contract with lower βα,w h i c h ,a sb e f o r e ,w i l lm a k et h eﬁrm strictly better oﬀ while
still satisfying creditor IR. Continuing this logic, the bad IC is binding at optimum. The
judge’s problem is to maximize the social surplus, ΠS = θx + y − K − βα(1 − θ)ϕ(1 − γ)y,
subject to the creditor IR, ΠC = 0, and bad IC, Rx = ββY . A brief investigation on
the ﬁrst order condition shows that the objective function is maximized by increasing βG
and η, and decreasing βB subject to the creditor IR and bad IC. For convenience, let us
rearrange the creditor IR in terms of βG and βB as follows. ΠC = ∆1−αβG + ∆αβB,w h e r e
∆α = θ(1 − ϕ)
γ+η−γη
η (1 − β)+θϕα +( 1− θ)ϕγα +( 1− θ)(1 − ϕ)(1 − β), and ∆1−α =
θ(1−ϕ)
γ+η−γη
η β +θϕ(1−α)+(1−θ)ϕγ(1−α)+(1−θ)(1−ϕ)β. Depending on whether the
βG reaches 0 ﬁrst or βB reaches one ﬁrst, the optimal reorganization law can be divided into
29Technically, we mean η = 1, in which case the outside buyer’s ex-ante expected proﬁt is zero, i.e. ΠB =0 .
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ηy < ∆α
30,t h e nβG =0a n dβB =
K/(ηy)
∆α .W h e n K
ηy > ∆α
31,t h e nβB =1
and βG =
K/(ηy)−∆α
∆1−α . Finally, since larger η gives larger social surplus, the judge, if he can32,
sets η to the maximum feasible value one.
Proposition 10 If access to the court is costless, then (ΠF)C > (ΠF)NC,where (ΠF)C is
the ﬁrm’s proﬁt under the optimal reorganization law and (ΠF)NC is the ﬁrm’s proﬁt under the
optimal private liquidation law; i.e. the ﬁrm’s optimal reorganization policy generates greater
proﬁt than the optimal private liquidation policy.
Proof. From Lemma 6,w es h o w e dβα < β0. Since the social surplus of the court and the
non-court cases are ΠCourt
S = θx +y − K − βα(1 − θ)ϕ(1 −γ)y and ΠNoCourt
S = θx +y −K −
β0(1−θ)ϕ(1−γ)y respectively, we get ΠCourt
S −ΠNoCourt
S =( β0 −βα)(1−θ)ϕ(1−γ)y>0.
Proposition 11 When reorganization laws are set optimally,
∂βα
∂θ < 0 and
∂βα
∂K > 0; the
optimal law for a given ﬁrm is more creditor-friendly when
a) the NPV is lower (higher K), and
b) cash ﬂows are riskier (lower θ, holding θx constant).
Proof. Rather than to take the derivative directly, it is more intuitive to have an interme-
diate step and use the chain rule. First, let us show
∂βα
∂θ < 0. for a small increase in θ,s a yδθ,
the creditor’s proﬁti n c r e a s e sb yδΠC = δθ{ϕ(1 − γ)βαηy +( 1− ϕ)ββ(Y − ηy)} > 0. i.e. by
increasing θ, the creditor’s proﬁt also increases. Since at optimum, the creditor IR is binding
at zero, βα needs to be adjusted to bring ΠC back to zero. Since
∂(δΠC)
∂βα = ϕ(1−γ)ηy>0, βα
needs to be decreased to decrease ΠC.A s a r e s u l t , a s θ increases, βα decreases. i.e.
∂βα
∂θ < 0,
which was to be shown.
To show
∂βα
∂K > 0, we follow similar steps. Since δΠC < 0w h e nδK>0, we need to adjust
βα to increase ΠC and make the creditor IR to bind at optimum. Since we already know
∂(δΠC)
∂βα = ϕ(1 − γ)ηy>0, βα needs to be increased to increase ΠC.A s a r e s u l t βα increases
when K increases. .i.e.
∂βα
∂K > 0, which was to be shown.
30We denote this case as ”high-NPV” project, because compared to the other case discussed below, the
initial investment in this case is relatively low and the liquidation probabilites, βG and βB, do not need to be
large to make the creditor break even. Hence, as shown in the following result, the judge saves all ﬁrms upon
receiving good signal, sG, and liquidates with some probability, βB, upon receiving bad signal, sB.
31In contrast to the previous case, we denote this case as ”low-NPV” project. In this case it is more diﬃcult
to satisfy the creditor IR than in the ”high-NPV” project case. Hence, the judge liquidates all projects upon
receiving a bad signal, sB,a n ds a v e ss o m eﬁrms with positive probability, βG, upon receiving good signal, sG.
32For cases where the judge is unable to set the bargaining power, we can take η as an exogenously given
parameter.
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∂βα
∂α > 0 and
∂βα
∂β > 0;a st h ec o u r t
becomes more eﬀective (less eﬀective), the optimal law becomes more debtor-friendly (creditor
friendly).
Proof. All we need to show is
∂βα
∂α > 0a n d
∂βα
∂β > 0. There are two cases, the ”high-NPV”
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− (1 − θ)(1 − ϕ)} > 0
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η
β +( 1− θ)(1 − ϕ)β}{∆α + ∆1−α − K/(ηy)} > 0
where ∆α + ∆1−α − K/(ηy) > 0 for feasible projects, because this is the creditor IR with the
highest liquidation probability, i.e. βG =1a n dβB =1 . I f∆α + ∆1−α − K/(ηy) < 0, the
the project will not be funded by the creditor because no feasible liquidation probability will








γ + η − γη
η
+( 1− θ)(1 − ϕ)}{∆α + ∆1−α − K/(ηy)} > 0
Corollary 13 Social surplus decreases with judicial errors α and β.
Proof. To see this, the result of Lemma 6 implies that as the judicial error increases, the
diﬀerence between βα and βG also increases. Hence, for a given minimum value of βG,t h e
social surplus decreases because βα increases. In other words, for limited range33 of βG and
βB, the judicial errors α and β further restricts the range of βα, which directly aﬀects the
social surplus.
Proposition 14 (The Eﬀect of Legal Enforcement)
∂βα
∂ρ < 0; the optimal “debtor-friendliness”
of the bankruptcy law depends positively on the degree of enforcement (ρ)34.
Proof. Rather than taking the derivative directly, we follow an indirect approach as in
Proposition 11. First consider the ”high-NPV” case. When ρ increases to ρ+δρ, Rx increases
33Since βG and βB are probabilites, they are restricted to lie between zero and one. Furthermore, the
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βB)δρy]+( 1− ϕ)δRx} +( 1− θ){ϕ[(1 − α)(1 − βG)δρy + α(1 − βB)δρy]+( 1− ϕ)[β(1 −
βG)δρY +( 1− β)(1 − βB)δρY ]} − K>0 i.e. as ρ increases, ΠC increases too. Since at
optimum, creditor IR should bind to zero, we need to adjust βα to decrease ΠC and make it
ΠC =0 . S i n c e
∂ΠC
∂βB = θ{ϕ[(1 − α)0 + α(−ρy + ηy)] + (1 − ϕ)(1 − ρ)αY } +( 1− θ){ϕ[(1 −
α)0 + α(−ρy + ηγy)] + (1 − ϕ)[β0+( 1− β)(−ρY + ηy)]} > 035, βB needs to be decreased
to decrease ΠC. i.e.
∂βα
∂ρ < 0. Next, consider the ”low-NPV” case. We already know
∂ΠC
∂ρ < 0. In order to make ΠC = 0, we need to decrease ΠC.S i n c e , ∂Rx
∂βG =( 1− ρ)βY> 0
and
∂ΠC
∂βG = θ(1−ϕ)(1−ρ)βY +θϕαηy+(1−θ)(ϕγα+(1−ϕ)β)ηy>0, βG, and consequently
βα
36, must be decreased to bring ΠC back to zero. i.e.
∂βα
∂ρ < 0.
Lemma 15 Let f βG(f K) and g βB(f K) be an optimal reorganization law for a ﬁrm with startup
cost f K. Then a necessary condition for ﬁrms to choose the court-based reorganization law to
resolve distress under the policy { f βG(f K),g βB(f K)} is given by K ≤ f K.
Proof. Before starting the proof, let us describe each agent’s ex-ante expected proﬁtf r o m
the project, when the liquidation probabilities are exogenously set as c βG and d βB, the initial
investment is c K, and the payment in good state that makes creditor to break even is c Rx
37.F o r
convenience, let’s deﬁne the probability of liquidation of the eﬃc i e n tm a n a g e r( g o o dt y p e )a n d
the probability of liquidation of the ineﬃcient manager (bad type) as c βα =( 1− α) c βG + αd βB
and c ββ = β c βG +( 1− β)d βB.T h e n t h e ﬁrm’s, the creditor’s, and the outside buyer’s ex-ante
expected proﬁt from the project are
ΠF = θ{x + ϕ[(1 − c βα)(1 − ρ)y + c βα(1 − η)y]+( 1− ϕ)[x − c Rx + Y
+(1 − c ββ)0 + c ββ0]} +( 1− θ){ϕ[(1 − c βα)(1 − ρ)y + c βα0]
+(1 − ϕ)[(1 − c ββ)(1 − ρ)Y + c ββ0]}
ΠC = θ{ϕ[(1 − c βα)ρy + c βαηy]+( 1− ϕ)[ c Rx +( 1− c ββ)0 + c ββ0]}
+(1 − θ){ϕ[(1 − c βα)ρy + c βαηγy]+( 1− ϕ)[(1 − c ββ)ρY + c ββηy]} − c K
ΠB = θ{ϕ[(1 − c βα)0 + c βα0] + (1 − ϕ)[(1 − γ)(1 − η)y +( 1− c ββ)0 + c ββ0]}
35Two things are worth noticing. First, since βG =0i sﬁxed, changing βα implies changing βB.S e c o n d ,
s i n c ew ea s s u m e dρ to be small, ρy<ηy, ργy<ηy and ρY< ηy.
36Since βB =1i sﬁxed, changing βα implies changing βG.
37Since creditor behave competitively, the ﬁrm makes a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer that makes the creditor to
break even.
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The social surplus can be obtained by summing each agent’s ex-ante expected proﬁtf r o mt h e
project, which becomes
ΠS = ΠF + ΠC + ΠB = θx + y − c K − c βα(1 − θ)(1 − ϕ)(1 − γ)y
Now consider when the ﬁrm will choose not to participate in the reorganization law. There
are three possible situations, i.e. when ﬁrm’s proﬁt by pursuing court is negative, when bad
IC is violated, and when ﬁrm’s proﬁt by avoiding court is larger than that by pursuing the
court. Since, we assume η = 1, which implies outside buyer’s proﬁti sz e r o ,ﬁrm’s proﬁt
equals social surplus, ΠF = ΠS. Hence, the ﬁrst case, ΠF < 0, implies a trivial case where
the project itself is not proﬁtable enough. The second case implies that both the good and
the bad type will strategically default, in which case the creditor make not enough proﬁtt o
break even. Finally, the third case is technically most involved, and the result may depend
on speciﬁc choice of parameters, and hence will not be considered in detail in this paper. So,
by the infeasible region of the reorganization law, we mean the violation of the second case,
where bad IC is not satisﬁed. To simplify notation let us denote
ΠC(c βα, c ββ, c K, c Rx)=θ{ϕ[(1 − c βα)ρy + c βαηy]+( 1− ϕ)[ c Rx +( 1− c ββ)0
+c ββ0]} +( 1− θ){ϕ[(1 − c βα)ρy + c βαηγy]
+(1 − ϕ)[(1 − c ββ)ρY + c ββηy]} − c K
For K>f K, ΠC(βα,ββ,K,R x) = 0 by the deﬁnition of the optimal reorganization law for K-
ﬁrm, and ΠC(f βα, f ββ,K,R x) < 0, because f βα < βα and f ββ < ββ
38. Hence to satisfy creditor
IR under f βα and f ββ, Rx need to be raised to R
0
x,w h e r eR
0
x >R x,i . e .ΠC(f βα, f ββ,K,R
0
x)=0 .
Notice that bad IC is binding at optimum. i.e. x − Rx + Y = x − R0 +( 1− ββ)Y .H e n c e
x − R
0
x + Y< x − R0 +( 1− f ββ)Y ,b e c a u s eR
0
x >R x and f ββ < ββ. Therefore bad IC
is violated when K>f K.F o r K<f K, ΠC(βα,ββ,K,R x)=0b yt h ed e ﬁnition of the
optimal reorganization law for K-ﬁrm, and ΠC(f βα, f ββ,K,R x) > 0, because f βα > βα and
f ββ > ββ
39. Hence to satisfy creditor IR under f βα and f ββ, Rx need to be lowered to R
0
x,





∂K > 0, e K<Kimplies f βα < βα and f ββ < ββ.





∂K > 0, e K>Kimplies f βα > βα and f ββ > ββ.
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0
x <R x,i . e .ΠC(f βα, f ββ,K,R
0
x) = 0. Notice that bad IC is binding at optimum. i.e.
x−Rx+Y = x−R0+(1−ββ)Y . Hence x−R
0
x+Y> x −R0+(1− f ββ)Y ,b e c a u s eR
0
x <R x and
f ββ > ββ.T h e r e f o r e b a d I C i s s a t i s ﬁed when K<f K.A s a r e s u l t , ﬁrms with K>f K will not
participate the reorganization law, and ﬁrms with K<f K may participate the reorganization
law. In the latter case, the ﬁrm will choose to pursue the court if ΠCourt
F > ΠNoCourt
F and will
not pursue if ΠCourt
F > ΠNoCourt
F .
Proposition 16 The infeasible region of the reorganization law is expanding with increas-
i n gt y p eI Ie r r o r ,β, and is contracting with increasing type I error, α, and increasing level of
enforcement, ρ.
Proof. Let us ﬁrst prove the eﬀect of type I error, α. As the type I error, α,i n c r e a s e s ,
f βα =( 1− α) f βG + αg βB increases as well, because βG < βB, and larger weight is given to
βB relative to βG,w h e r e a sf ββ remains unchanged. Inspection of ΠC indicates that as f βα
increases, ΠC also increases40 for ﬁxed f ββ.S i n c e f K is the initial investment level that makes
f βα and f ββ an optimal reorganization law, f K must be adjusted to make ΠC =0 . S i n c e
∂ΠC
∂e K < 0, f K must be increased to decrease ΠC and bring it back to zero. i.e. increase in α
causes increase in f K, or formally ∂e K
∂α > 0. Since the upper boundary of infeasible region is
ﬁxed to K, increase in the lower boundary, f K, implies contraction of the infeasible region of
the reorganization law.
Next, let us prove the eﬀect of type II error, β. As the type II error, β,i n c r e a s e s ,f ββ =
β f βG +( 1− β)g βB decreases, because βG < βB, and larger weight is given to βG relative to
βB,w h e r e a sf βα remains unchanged. Inspection of ΠC indicates that as f ββ decreases, ΠC
decreases41 for ﬁxed f βα.S i n c e f K is the initial investment level that makes f βα and f ββ an
optimal reorganization law, f K must be adjusted to make ΠC =0 . S i n c e
∂ΠC
∂e K < 0, f K must be
decreased to increase ΠC and bring it back to zero. i.e. increase in β causes decrease in f K,
or formally ∂e K
∂β < 0. Since the upper boundary of infeasible region is ﬁxed to K, decrease in
the lower boundary, f K, implies expansion of the infeasible region of the reorganization law.
Finally, let’s prove the eﬀect of the degree of enforcement, ρ. As the degree of enforcement,
ρ, increases creditor’s proﬁt, ΠC,i n c r e a s e sa sw e l l ,b e c a u s e
∂ΠC
∂ρ > 0. Since f K is the initial
investment level that makes f βα and f ββ an optimal reorganization law, f K must be adjusted
to make ΠC =0 . S i n c e
∂ΠC
∂e K < 0, f K must be increased to decrease ΠC and bring it back to
40Formally, one can show that ∂ΠC
∂ e βα
> 0. Also, intuitively, as the probability of liquidation increases, the
creditor’s proﬁt increases because creditor get positive payment only by liquidation upon default.
41Formally, one can show that ∂ΠC
∂ e ββ
> 0. Also, intuitively, as the probability of liquidation decreases, the
creditor’s proﬁt decreases because creditor get positive payment only by liquidation upon default.
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∂ρ > 0. Since the upper boundary
of infeasible region is ﬁxed to K, increase in the lower boundary, f K, implies contraction of
the infeasible region of the reorganization law.
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